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ABSTRACT 
Nguvitjita Kahiha,  
Master of Arts 
Department of International Studies 
University of Kansas 
 
 
During the early 1980s, Europe suffered from slow economic growth. As a 
result of this stagnant growth pattern, the European Union created new economic 
policies and reforms, which eliminated tariffs and barriers among European member 
states, and set new rules for competition law. The European Union eliminated most 
regional trade barriers but was not able to achieve the same success with inter-
regional barriers. While many supporters of European Union applauded the reform, 
several American companies claimed that Europe’s new economic regulations pose 
disadvantages for American companies in form of a fortress. Constraints are the 
outcomes of different institutional regulations and protectionism. This study will 
present the arguments from both sides of the Atlantic and conclude that the 
opportunities created by the European Union outweigh the constraints for some non- 
European companies. 
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PART I 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The advancement of technology, similarity of markets, cheaper 
communication and transportation opportunities, and declining trade barriers have 
encouraged companies to expand business abroad with hopes of increasing their 
global market share.1 In the post-World War II era, globalization is characterized by 
the evolution of trading blocks and regional integrated markets. Within each 
integrated market, nations open up their individual markets and are able to establish 
interdependence among member states. The newly formed integrated market system 
allows economic growth through trade liberalization and competition. Today, there 
are more than 25 different economic regions, with three integrated markets 
dominating global trade: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
between the United States, Canada and Mexico, Japan/Asia, and the European Union 
(EU).2 These dominating entities are similar in terms of consistent economic growth, 
infrastructure with uniform demand and protectionist pressure.3 The European Union 
is considered the most integrated region because it has established an economic union, 
as well as a single market, single currency and institutions that represent all member 
states on trade policy issues.4   
                                                 
1 Porter, 1986 pg. 2 
2 Japan/ Asia is not an official integrated union 
3 Rugman et al, 2004 pg. 4 
4 European Commission, 2002 pg. 1 
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If these newly integrated markets follow a free market system that sparks 
economic growth opportunities, could multinational enterprises (MNE) experience 
similar growth in all regions? Some scholars would argue that they could not.  
A new school of thought in international business, led by Alan Rugman, 
argues that globalization is a myth, because most business activities are not conducted 
in one single global market, but instead by companies within each of these regional 
blocks.5 Based upon empirical research, this new school of thought claims that most 
multinational enterprises are not global companies but rather semi-global or regional 
companies which gain the majority of sales from their regional home markets. 6 
Rugman argues that only companies with significant market share in all three 
dominant regions can be considered “true” global companies. Rugman claims that 
multinational enterprises face constraints in potential host regions in the form of non-
tariff barriers.7 An important reason is the liability of foreignness. The liability of 
foreignness can be defined as a competitive disadvantage to foreign firms in a host 
market, because local companies have more knowledge about their economy and 
culture.   “The liability of intra-regional expansion appears to be much lower than the 
liability of inter-regional expansion,” therefore, they focus on doing business in their 
home region.8 Rugman’s view adds to the argument that American companies face 
considerable impediments to trade.  
                                                 
5 Rugman et al, 2001 pg. 1 
6 Rugman et al, 2006 pg. 2 
7 Rugman, 1998 pg. 6 
8 Rugman et al, 2006 pg. 3 
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Existing literature explains how the creation of the European Union has 
affected transatlantic relations. Prior to the creation of the European Union, American 
companies were concerned that the new Europe would create a European fortress and 
keep non-European goods out of the region or at least make it more difficult for them 
to enter. 9  Even 15 years later, many U.S. companies argue that there is still a 
European fortress in the form of protectionism, and strict regulations. On the other 
hand, advocates of the European Union explain that the European Union’s economic 
policies create opportunities for American companies in Europe. Both sides of the 
Atlantic have legitimate arguments about the benefits and barriers that the European 
Union creates. This raises an important theoretical question: What opportunities does 
the European Union create for American companies? 
 
1.2. Structure of Study 
First, this study explains the economic characteristics of the European Union. 
It summarizes the evolution of the market, as well as evaluating the Union’s 
objectives of creating a more dynamic market with competitive companies. Second, 
the study presents complaints from American companies regarding the economic 
constraints arising from the establishment of a single European market. These series 
of constraints contribute to a phenomenon often referred as the “European fortress”. 
Complaints from American companies include European protectionism and strict 
regulations which impede American entry into the market. Third, this study examines 
                                                 
9 Lynn, 1992 pg. 29 
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Europe’s response to the accusation of creating a European fortress. European Union 
advocates argue that the European Union encourages transatlantic ties with the 
American market. While there are new constraints created by implementing the 
European Union, evidence supports the argument that the European Union is striving 
for stronger relationships with the American market. The final parts of this study 
propose possible opportunities for American companies in the European Union.   
 
1.3. Significance of study 
Regional market integration theory focuses mainly on the benefits to local 
companies and the constraints on foreign companies. This research, however, 
presents opportunities for multinational companies from non-member countries who 
seek to penetrate the European Union’s market. It outlines some possible 
opportunities that are outcomes of the economic reforms. Multinational companies 
can then apply strategies related to firm-specific advantages to exploit these 
opportunities. This study also invites further studies on how to exploit trade 
opportunities of other regional integrated markets. 
 
1.4. Hypothesis  
This paper discusses the characteristics of the European Union in a business 
context. International business, free trade and institutional theory explain that the 
European Union provides the composition of regulations and policies that will: (a) 
indirectly set new constraints for U.S. firms entering the market; and (b) facilitate 
    5
individual U.S. firms to operate within the European Union. In other words, the 
European institutional framework eliminates internal trade barriers and creates strict 
regulations to provide security to the European environment, citizens and market. By 
doing so, it raises impediments to trade to non-European countries.  However, despite 
these constraints, some American companies will find lucrative opportunities by 
overcoming the constraints.  
    6
PART II 
 
2.1. The European Union: Brief History 
The European Union has accomplished market integration in a relatively short 
time and to an unprecedented extent. Following the theory of regional economic 
integration, which holds that countries within a particular region can jointly gain 
economically by entering into agreements to reduce or eliminate tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, Europe went from a customs union to an economic union in less than 50 
years. 10  In theory, within the European Union, European companies can take 
advantages of the free flow of goods and services, labor and capital. In addition, the 
establishment of a single currency, the Euro, encourages foreign direct investment, 
because it increases transparency, permits comparison of member countries, and 
reduces risk to investors, as a stable currency. To better understand the evolution of 
the European Union, this section will explain the reason for creating a single market 
and the possible economic effects to European companies.  
 
2.2. The European Union: From Eurosclerosis to European Optimism 
Since the end of World War II, several European states keenly sought a 
strategy to reduce the risk of further military conflicts and provide economic 
development to revive the destroyed economies. In 1951, six European countries, -
Germany (West), Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and France- signed the 
                                                 
10 Hill, 2004 pp. 272-273 
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Treaty of Paris, creating the European Coal-Steal Community and setting in motion 
the process that would lead to the European Economic Community, the forerunner of 
the European Union. The European Coal and Steel Community’s objective was to 
wed the war prone countries that hosted two wars in a thirty year time span. 
In 1957, the Treaty of Rome established an economic integration in the 
European Economic Community by eliminating all barriers between member states. It 
set forth a common external trade policy through intergovernmental cooperation.11 
The transition to a common market took several years to implement, but success was 
evident from the start. Following the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the six European 
Economic Community states experienced a significant increase in economic growth, 
which notably can be accounted to the increase of trade among them.12  The European 
Union also designed several policies that would protect certain important European 
industries, such as the agricultural industry.13 
The intra-regional economic boost encouraged many neighboring countries to 
apply for membership to the European Economic Community. Since the creation of 
the European Economic Community in the late 1950s, more than 20 other European 
countries have applied for membership, with most applications granted. In 1973, the 
United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark entered the European alliance. Over the 
following thirteen years, three southern European countries (Portugal, Greece and 
Spain) joined the community. In 1996, Austria, Finland and Sweden broke out of a 
                                                 
11  Van Oudenaren, 2000 pg. 8 
12 Dinan, 2005 pp. 47-48 
13 See Case study in Part IV 
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free trade area alliance (European Free Trade Association) to enlarge the area of 
economic integration to 15 states. However, the largest influx happened in 2004 when 
ten eastern European countries were able to claim the European Union flag. The latest 
enlargement took place in 2007, adding two more nations to the market with three 
more nations on the waiting list. 
Table 1: European Enlargement 
 
Year 
 
Countries 
No. of 
countries 
Population as of 
2005 in millions 
1957 Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Luxemburg  6 228.8 
1973 Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom  3 69.4 
1981 Greece 1 11.1 
1986 Spain, Portugal  2 48.7 
1995 Austria, Finland, Sweden 3 22.4 
2004 Cyprus, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia  
10 73.6 
2007 Bulgaria, Rumania  2 29.5 
Turkey, Croatia, Republic of Macedonia,   3 78.0 Future 
Enlarge
ments: 
Prospected Size   30 561.5 
Data source: http://europa.eu/abc/index_en.htm 
 
The continuous overhaul of economic policies in the European Union has 
been greatly anticipated and supported by Europeans amid economic stagnation in the 
early-1980s.14 The European member states faced several economic shocks that led to 
economic problems. 15  Europe experienced a high rate of job loss and economic 
stagnation.16 European companies lacked competitiveness, because of the inability to 
apply free trade among the member states. Due to small markets and different market 
regulations, companies were not able to achieve economies of scale.  The trade flow 
                                                 
14 Hunter, 1991 
15 Dinan, 2005 pp. 69-74 
16 Hunter, 1991 
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of goods and services was slowed down by unnecessary delays on borders between 
countries. Similar inefficiencies were evident in cross-border financial services, the 
transfer of knowledge, technology and labor. Some explanations for the negative 
economic trends were high labor costs due to excessive social protection, high labor 
concentration in slow growth industries and inefficient institutional regulations.17 
This phenomenon in Europe of poor job creation and lack of competitiveness within 
the business sector was frequently referred to as “Eurosclerosis”. 18  As a result, 
European regulators refined the European Economic Community to provide 
economic reforms that would allow “economic dynamism allied to social 
protection.”19 
The Single European Act intended to allow the European Economic 
Community to create a competitive market with more competitive European 
companies. In 1984, the European Community decided to “re-launch” Europe by 
creating a single internal market.20 Lord Cockfield, an economist from the United 
Kingdom, who served for several years under the Thatcher administration, was one of 
the chief architects of the single market. His key principle for a successful and 
functional single market was an open market, without barriers or access to 
competition. In an interview, Cockfield explained his strategic decisions, “Once you 
get the frontier down and you allow trade to flow freely, those sheer pressures of 
trade will eliminate many of the barriers. You release the competitive force... Getting 
                                                 
17 Navarro, 1998 
18 Alogoskoufis, 2007; Flingstein et al, 1996 pg. 10 
19 Mandelson, 2005 
20 Guttman, 1992 pg. 13 
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rid of the barriers and the forces of competition will perfect the market.”21  The Single 
European Act was signed in 1986 and refined the European Economic Community’s 
mission to unify the European market. The objectives were to complete the reform by 
the end of 1992.22 
The single market of the European Union came into effect in 1987 with a 
target date of December 31, 1992 for full implementation, and was based upon 
eliminating barriers of goods and services, labor and capital. This would allow goods, 
services, money and people to move freely across the member states. Most time-
consuming and costly administrative procedures were eliminated. Labor could 
relocate to regions where skilled labor was in demand and tourism became easier and 
more convenient. In order to institute technical regulations and standards, the 
European Union employed uniform set of standards that established “essential 
requirements” for the production of goods. At the same time, member states entered 
into “Mutual Recognition Agreements”, which required all countries to accept goods 
and services from other member countries when meeting the necessary safety, health 
and environmental requirements. 23  This reduced research and development costs 
dramatically. The testing and quality control for a product had to pass only one 
standard requirement. For example, the automobile industry had to conduct only one 
crash test. The harmonization of laws and practices allowed lawyers, accountants and 
doctors to work throughout the European Union without obtaining new licenses for 
                                                 
21 Guttman, 1992 pg. 14 
22 Moravcsik, 1991 pg. 24 
23 Oudenaren, 2000 pg.106; Flingstein et al, 1996 pg. 18 
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each new country. The European Union implemented high standards and strict rules 
to satisfy the demand for consumer and environmental protection.  
One core aim of the European Union was to allow healthy competition within the 
market. The European Commission is the institutional apparatus of the European 
Union that monitors competition policies and ensures that no business monopolizes 
the market. 24  Similar to the European Central Bank, the Commission is an 
independent body that represents the Union, not individual states. The European 
Commission deregulated several industries and demanded that governments privatize 
state-owned enterprises. Governments lost partial or full control over state-owned 
enterprises and national protected companies in certain industries. These companies 
had a monopolistic status in the domestic market and now have to compete with new 
companies. The increased competition resulted in declining prices and profit 
margins.25 To offset the lower profit margins, companies applied new strategies to 
become more efficient in production. As a result, the European Union provides the 
foundation of a stronger dynamic market with competitive companies and economic 
growth potential.   
Additional reforms and reform revisions took place after 1992.  The creation of 
the European Monetary Union ushered Europe into a new phase of economic 
integration. The adoption of a single currency, common monetary fiscal policy and 
harmonized tax policy were all characteristics of an economic union.26 There was 
                                                 
24 Hill, 2004 pg. 281 
25 Ilzkovitz et al, 2007 pg. 28 
26 Hill, 2004 pg. 275 
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significant economic and political reasoning behind the establishing of the Euro. It 
was aligned with Europe’s mission to eliminate non-tariff trade barriers that were 
created by differing exchange rates and currency fluctuation and facilitated intra-
European trade. Scholars in international business show that countries with common 
currencies and membership in the same economic market have an increased 
likelihood of internal trade (over 300 %!). 27  A single currency would eliminate 
exchange costs thus would save money from international transactions. The internal 
effects of strengthening the European integration also had external effects. The 
creation of the Euro strengthened Europe’s position in world affairs, politically and 
economically, with the Euro competing with the US dollar.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Ghemawat, 2001 pg. 138 
28 Oudenaren, 2000 pg. 169; Rifkin, 2004 pg. 64 
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Graph 1: Exchange Rate U.S. dollar/Euro 
Exchange Rate U.S. dollar/Euro
$0.00
$0.20
$0.40
$0.60
$0.80
$1.00
$1.20
$1.40
$1.60
$1.80
$2.00
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Statistical Data from European Central Bank 
U
S 
D
ol
la
rs
Exchange Rate
http://www.ecb.int/stats/html/index.en.html
 
The introduction of the Euro faced concerns within the market. Member states 
were skeptical about its economic effects on the market and the loss of monetary 
sovereignty. Several countries opted not to join the Euro zone. Only 13 of 27 
countries agreed to change currency. Germany and France lobbied hard for its 
implementation and introduced several policies to facilitate the introduction of the 
Euro. In the 1980’s the European Union established the European Monetary System 
to lock all European currencies against the ECU (forerunner of the Euro), which 
    14
provided monetary stability.29 The Maastricht Treaty provided guidelines for the Euro 
zone. States had to meet certain requirements to be eligible to join the Euro zone. 
Countries had to control inflation to guarantee price stability and national exchange 
rates. Furthermore, they had to keep the national deficit under three percent and had 
to provide competitive, long term interest rates.30 For future assurance, the countries 
signed the stability and growth pact, which would punish countries that fell below the 
requirements. 
Map 1: Eurozone- 2008  
 
Source: http://frazer.rice.edu/~erkan/blog/archives/EurozoneMap.gif 
 
                                                 
29 Oudenaren, 2000 pp. 174-175 
30 Oudenaren, 2000 pg. 186 
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Since the last accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, the European 
Union has become a 27 state strong union with three more countries (Turkey, Croatia 
and Macedonia) on the waiting list. The population is reaching nearly half a billion 
people communicating in 23 official languages. 31   Today, 15 years after the 
implementation of the European Union, Europe was able to battle its malady of 
“Eurosclerosis”. In 2006, the European job market increased by about 3.5 million 
which was twice as much than the job creation prior the 1992 integration.32 The 
European Union member states were also able to reduce their deficit and participated 
in expanding European economic growth. Intra-Eurozone data suggests that the Euro 
had a positive effect on trade flow among these countries.33  In addition, foreign 
direct investment among the member states increased and had a significant impact on 
gross domestic product of the new member states. These results are clearly a sign that 
economic reform in Europe and future development seems promising.  A country 
portfolio analysis concludes that enlarging Europe by inducting Turkey and Norway, 
the European Union would experience additional economic growth and stability.34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 CIA, 2007 
32 European Commission, 2006 
33 European Commission, 2007  
34 Goldberg, 2000 
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Graph 2: Employment Rate of EU (27 Countries)  
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* The employment rate is calculated by dividing the number of persons aged 15 to 64 in employment by 
the total population of the same age group. The indicator is based on the EU Labour Force Survey. The 
survey covers the entire population living in private households and excludes those in collective 
households such as boarding houses, halls of residence and hospitals. Employed population consists of 
those persons who during the reference week did any work for pay or profit for at least one hour, or were 
not working but had jobs from which they were temporarily absent. 
 
A report by the European Commission, titled “Steps towards a deeper 
economic integration,” has analyzed in detail European economic performance. 
According to the report, trade liberalization and market openness allowed companies 
to compete for market share. As a result, competition changed market conditions by 
creating new market leaders and reducing profit margins by 3.9 % in the 1990s.35  
The report suggests that European companies have implemented more competitive 
and cost-efficient strategies to offset the reduction of profit margins and increased 
competition for market share.  
                                                 
35 European Commission, 2007 pg. 42 
    17
“Evidence shows that between 1987 and 2000, firms in the Internal 
Market have expanded in size and increased their presence beyond 
national borders, often via cross-border mergers and acquisitions  
involving firms from different Member States and from outside the EU. 
Whereas in 1987, EU leading firms were on average active in three 
countries, this number increased to an average of five countries…. The 
sharper competition in the Internal Market can also contribute to the 
elimination or take-over of the least efficient firms, leaving only fewer 
producers (bigger and more efficient) in the market. This should result 
in an increase in production concentration at the EU level. ”36  
 
It can be concluded from this passage of the report that the economic policies 
of the European Union created more competitive companies, and a more dynamic 
market. 
Graph 3: Growth Rate: Gross Domestic Product of EU (27 Countries) 
Economic Growth Rate  EU (27 Countires)  in %
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36 European Commission, 2007 pg. 43 
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2.3. Summary 
European Union institutions reduced internal trade barriers and created a 
dynamic European market with more competitive European companies.  The 
European Union has increased its economic power in the world market by creating 
the most integrated regional economic region in the world. Intraregional trade flow 
has increased, and all member states have benefited from the membership and 
enlargement. Economic dynamism can be achieved by allowing companies to apply 
an economy of scale in the extended market. The elimination of barriers allows 
supply chain operations to run more effective, and transfer of knowledge and 
technology becomes faster and efficient. Free flow of labor and investment lets 
companies to pull skilled labor from different regions or move operations to areas 
where factor endowments are abundant.  
 
    19
PART III 
 
3.1. The European Fortress 
The flip side to the elimination of trade barriers within the European Unions is 
the creation of constraints to non-European companies.  Both sides of the Atlantic 
present different perspectives on the European economic integration. The U.S. 
government and some of its companies claim that the new policies create 
impediments to trade, which make it more complicated for U.S. businesses to 
compete equally with European companies in Europe. The constraints that are created 
by implementing stricter safety, consumer and environment standards as well as the 
protection of certain industries, are frequently referred to as a fortress. These new 
standards and regulations are more costly to meet for many companies.  This part of 
the study will give a theoretical explanation about the impediments of trade. Trade 
disputes and transatlantic issues will explain that European protectionism and 
Europe’s stricter regulations are the cause of impediments.  
 
3.2. Theoretical explanations of transatlantic trade 
A new school of thought in international business has surfaced which argues 
most multinational enterprises are not actually global companies but rather regional 
or semi-global, because most of their revenues are generated in the home region.37 
They are focusing activities within the expanded and deepened home market instead 
                                                 
37 Ghemawat 2003; Rugman et al,  2001, 2003, 2004 
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of non-regional markets. This theory is based on cross-regional trade flows in the 
three dominant economic regions where most of the multinational enterprises are 
located and gain most of their revenues in their home region.38  Data shows that 60 
percent of European exports are within its region.39 While the US exports 20 percent 
of its total exports to the EU,40  this is far less than export to its NAFTA partners. 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the U.S. has a consistent trade deficit with 
Europe.41 The U.S. showed its discontent with EU economic policy-making by filing 
several disputes with the World Trade Organization.  
Alan Rugman, one of the promoters of this new regional trade theory, explains 
the reasons of this cross-regional trade trend, which are based on the effects of non-
tariff barrier constraints: 
 
“One reason for this is the presence of non-tariff barriers to trade and 
investment in these regions. These are designed to limit access to 
internal markets or to give preferential access to certain partners in 
return for reciprocal advantages. Such barriers include rules of origin, 
discriminatory health and safety codes, exemptions from trade 
agreements claimed for certain sectors (such as culture, education, 
health), poorly administered anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
laws, and so on.”42  
 
 
The theory explains that the lack of cross-market performance is due to the 
external threats of competition, protectionism, and local preferences and the inability 
                                                 
38 Rugman et al, 1998, 2002, 2004 
39 Rugman et al, 2001 pg. 6 
40 Rugman et al, 2001 pg. 6 
41 U.S. Census, 2007 
42 Rugman et al, 1998 
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to apply internal strengths in the host region.43 Most multinational companies focus 
on products, processes or business models to try to create firm-specific advantages or 
comparative advantages. In order to increase their market share, companies adopt or 
modify their business model to the local market to achieve economies of scale.44 
However, there are external threats in the host market that hinder multinational 
companies’ ability to penetrate new markets effectively. For example, products that 
meet consumer needs or preferences in one market might not have the same success 
in another market. In this case, it is important to understand the consumers’ tastes and 
preferences. Some markets perform slower; thus, economic growth might not be as 
easy to achieve as in a fast growing market. There is also the threat of competition 
and protection of certain industries. Since most multinational companies produce 
goods that require high capital investments, penetrating a market that does not 
guarantee enough return on investments, creates constraints. 45  These investments 
include funds to cover costs arising from differences in standards. 
Another explanation of external threats on cross-regional trade is the impact 
of distance.46  Pankaj Ghemawat, Professor at the Harvard Business School, designed 
a framework that measures the attractiveness of foreign markets by examining four 
distance dimensions of a market. Distance, in this context, represents differences or 
similarities between markets. This framework states that there is a distance between 
trade regions with regards to culture, economy and governance, which determines 
                                                 
43 Rugman et al, 2004 pg. 6 
44 Ghemawat, 2003 pg. 1 
45 Rugman et al, 2004 pg. 4 
46 Rugman et al, 2006 pg 3 
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how attractive trade is among regions.47 In other words, if the distance between two 
markets’ cultures, economies, or governments is large, the combination is less 
attractive for doing business. There are certain distances that existed before the 
creation of the European Union, such as language barriers and geographic distance. 
These still exist.  
The establishment of European institutions affects distances as well. 
Ghemawat suggests that regulations and policies of individual governments are the 
source of most common trade barriers.48 He goes on to argue that regulatory bodies 
protect their markets if foreign competition threatens important industries or 
companies to the region. The European Union eliminated all trade barriers within the 
market and functioned now as a single market. Hence it can be assumed that the 
European institutions, considered as a single regulatory body, are now a source of 
trade barriers, rather than the institutions of individual countries alone. As will be 
discussed later, European protectionism is evident in the agricultural industry. 
In order to form an interregional market that functions, authoritative 
institutions must set rules and enforce them. 49   The European Union has the 
challenging task of providing leadership to its member states and applying fair and 
appropriate external trade policies. It is also the responsibility of the European Union 
to provide equal opportunities to companies and allow free trade.  Without a well-
functioning regulative system, companies with unique competitive positions could 
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abuse their position by creating a monopoly and forcing competitors out of the 
market. If this should occur, consumers and the market would suffer. 
Regulations and laws for the European Union are set by different institutions 
in the Union regulatory body. Institutions function in three ways: regulative, 
normative, and cognitive.50 The regulatory institutions are by far those most affected 
by European unification. From an economic perspective, regulative institutions set the 
law of how business is conducted in the market. The intention of European 
institutions is to break down the barriers of trade within the market but also provide 
protection to the citizens. A free regional market created opportunities for 
competition and market share growth. Because most companies conduct business 
with a self-interested motive, it is imperative to establish a system to regulate 
economic activities. According to institutional theory, the regulative perspective 
allows institutions to establish rules, scrutinize firms and act accordingly if rules are 
breached or not complied.51 The established rules align with European’s mission to 
create a more competitive market and protect the environment and citizens. The 
objective of this approach is to create an external control system in which companies 
should conform to institutional regulations to avoid penalties or sanctions.52 Within 
the European Union, the European Commission enforces regulations and punishes 
companies if these regulations are not met. The European Union set high demanding 
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and strict regulations for the market to meet member states request of consumer and 
environmental protection.    
Within the last decade, the European Union has been in court battles with 
multinational enterprises including several U.S. computer companies that did not 
abide by European regulations. The European Union accused these companies of 
violating Europe’s anti-trust laws. For example, in 2004, Microsoft was penalized for 
abusing its competitive position by monopolizing Windows PC operating system.53 
The fine amounted to about half a billion dollars and it was the first time a company 
was assessed such a penalty.54  It took Microsoft over three years to comply with 
European regulations. During this time, the company was hit with daily penalties. 
Currently, Intel, another U.S. computer company, is accused of monopoly abuse. The 
European Union charged Intel with “anticompetitor strategies” because they 
pressured European retailers not to sell competitor products, and bribed 
manufacturers to delay or cancel the production of competitor products.55   
Europe took a strict position to force companies to conform to European 
regulations. The response to high penalties is to provide fair competition to 
companies in the market and to protect consumers, “…the measures that the 
Commission has insisted upon will benefit computer users by bringing competition 
and innovation back to the server market,” explained European Union Competition 
Commissioner Neelie Kroes.56  
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The European Commission is also the regulatory apparatus of anti-trust issues 
and other trade policies within the European Union. Most merger and acquisition 
activities have to be approved by the Commission. The European Commission tends 
to grant or deny merger applications based on different reasons than the U.S. 
Department of Justice. The failed General Electrics-Honeywell merger, which was 
blocked by the European Commission, is an example of how regulatory ideologies 
differ in Europe from the U.S. “The GE-Honeywell merger was a classic example of 
the difference in antitrust theory on both sides of the Atlantic.”57  
In 2001 Jack Welch, former chairman of General Electrics (GE), sought 
approval by the Justice Department’s Anti-Trust Division, for the GE-Honeywell 
merger. Both companies produced products for the airlines industries. Welch argued 
that the products were not overlapping. Instead, they are complementary, non-
competitive, and therefore should not create an antitrust concern.58  For the U.S. 
antitrust division, this distinction seemed sufficient to approve the merger. However, 
the European antitrust division, led by Italian economist Mario Monti, had a different 
view on this merger.59 According to Monti, the difference in the size of the companies 
was the problem. “The Europeans were concerned with the bigness (size of company 
after the merger) itself – the fear that a company with overwhelming presence in 
certain markets would use its sheer power to drive out competitors, and then drive up 
prices for consumers.”60  
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3.3. European protectionism 
Although integration was applauded from across the Atlantic, fear of 
excluding American products in Europe brought many American companies and 
politicians to the negotiation table with European regulators. The U.S. was concerned 
that eliminating the internal barrier within the European Union would create external 
tariff walls, thus creating a European fortress.61 In other words, the European Union is 
a large open market but protects itself from non-member states goods and services. 
This claim of a European fortress existed prior to the creation of the European Union. 
However, the European Union repeatedly maintained an innocent stand to this 
claim.62   
While the European Union’s policies intended to strengthen internal trade and 
support certain industries, these policies indirectly created impediments to trade for 
U.S. companies.63 In order for the European Union to be able to compete with other 
economic super powers, it had to apply a market strategy similar to the Japanese. This 
market strategy was based on internal freedom coupled with external protection.64  
Prior to the implementation of the European Union, Europe practiced three strategies 
that would protect the market from foreign companies. These strategies were: (a) anti-
dumping actions; (b) reciprocal deals; and (c) informal quotas.65  “Not only do anti-
dumping actions introduce protectionism under cover of GATT rules, they are also 
flexible. The ‘reasonable profit’ clause allows the (European) Commission to hit 
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almost anyone who is causing domestic manufacturers pain.”66  Since most of the 
anti-dumping actions happened in industries of European interest, foreign states argue 
that this is not a coincident but a protectionist strategy to keep competition out of the 
European Single Market. 
European protectionism could also be the result of bilateral agreements 
between the European Union and foreign entities, with both parties having the same 
access to each market. 67  These discriminatory agreements give special trade perks to 
a specific region. Since this only favors parties of the agreement, it deviates from free 
trade theory whereby all companies should have equal access to each market. It also 
intentionally puts conditions on foreign companies and limits their entry into the 
market. Finally, in order to meet the European mission of protecting important 
industries, the European Commission entered into several informal agreements to 
meet the members’ interests. Within the automobile industry, the European 
Commission agreed with Japan and limited automobile exports to Europe to 1.2 
million cars per year by 1999.68 Other examples of informal quotas are European 
subsidies to important European industries such as aerospace and energy. 
With regards to trade agreements with non-member states, the enlargement of 
the Union presented many disadvantages for transatlantic relationships. The United 
States signed agreements titled Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) with Central and 
Eastern European countries. These treaties were incompatible with the European 
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Union policy; therefore, the European Union demanded that the treaties be annulled 
before these markets could join.69 The United States had to revise their investment 
agreements with these countries so they would meet E.U. requirements.  
Other accusations of protectionism are constructed by the European 
regulations body to protect European companies from foreign competition. 70 
American critics of the European Union see the new Europe as a threat to American 
products. “The European Union is dangerous. It is a battleship Bismarck- blunting 
powerful American corporations, blocking sales of American beef, corn, and bananas, 
and plotting to demolish American leadership in world affairs.” 71  Although this 
statement of European protectionism is overstated, it seems evident that 
overregulation and regulatory restrictions create barriers to transatlantic trade. It can 
be concluded that the European Union creates some constraints to international trade 
to protect local companies. “The range of protectionist measures used by the 
European Commission has the effect of a wall if not quiet a fortress around the 
Community.” 72  Hence, European protectionism puts U.S. companies at a 
disadvantage.  
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3.4. Differences in regulatory systems and stricter standards 
Other critics argue that the European fortress is constructed by differences in 
stricter trade regulations, rather than protectionism.  The arguments existed prior to 
the unification and even 15 years later, many U.S. companies were concerned about 
the European fortress. For example, a research study on transatlantic trade relations 
titled “Barriers of Benefits”, disagrees with critics of the trade liberalization’s views 
which argue that international competition will lower regional standards to gain a 
competitive advantage.73 Instead, critics take the position that the European fortress is 
not a product of European protectionism, but rather cultural differences and a result of 
stricter regulatory policies. The European Commission focused its protection on the 
environment and consumers. Hence, European regulations are based on 
characteristics that provide protection for its citizens. Cultural differences existed 
long before European unification and, in fact, might have been somewhat reduced had 
a true ‘European identity’ taken hold. The influence of culture in policy-making is a 
major cause of transatlantic disputes. “Because both (US and EU) are affluent, open 
societies whose citizens place high value on consumer and environment protection, 
each is continually enacting new regulations and strengthening existing one.” 74 
Implementing new policies and modifying existing one, echoes Lord Cockfield’s 
argument of an imperfect working market that is a work in progress and slows down 
the process of free trade.  
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Two key points are found throughout this literature which argues that the 
differences in regulatory system, not protectionism, are the main causes of trade 
conflicts. First, the difference in regulatory system, with the importance placed upon 
public values and culture, hinder efficient transatlantic business relations. “Many 
problems faced by EC or U.S. exporters/investors on each other’s markets are not the 
deliberate result of protectionist inspired regulations, but rather the unintended 
outcome of measures adopted for valid domestic reasons of the differences which 
exist between the regulatory systems in the EC or US.”75  
The second key point is the European Union’s implementation of stricter 
regulations to satisfy member states. The beef hormones ban in Europe ignited a 
dispute that began in the 1980s when children in Italy experienced illness after 
consuming veal treated with growth hormones. As a result, environmental groups 
spoke out against hormones treated meat and several European countries banned 
certain or all beef hormones. Some European countries allowed these hormones for 
their beef production. However, with the creation of the European Union and its 
harmonization and standardization policies, the European Commission banned all 
hormones in the entire single market to keep a commitment to the market. European 
public opinion was another factor of the ban, which consequently led to a 
disagreement with U.S. beef producers who used hormones in their beef production.76 
U.S. beef exporters denounced the ban, because of the lack of scientific evidence that 
any of the banned hormones presented a health risk to consumers. The hormone ban 
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was based on European cultural principles to protect consumer preferences with or 
without scientific proof and to comply with their demands.77 The fact that the ban was 
based on consumer preference, gave the U.S. beef exporters enough to challenge the 
ban in front of the GATT and then the World Trade Organization. 
Europe’s response to these disputes reflected its ideology to trade regulation. 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs Edith Cresson explained, “This isn’t a way to 
avoid the importation of meat; it’s a matter of health.”78  Another comment made by a 
European Union representative was, “standards cannot and should not be solely based 
on science and that consumer preference should taken in account.”79  
Following several negotiations between the EU and international beef 
producers, the European Union loosened some of the bans and allowed certain beef 
hormones in the market. Although EU markets represented a small fraction of U.S. 
beef export, “the ban thus seemed to confirm America’s worst fears about the 
emergence of Fortress Europe, that the liberalization of Europe’s internal market 
would be accompanied by an increase in external trade barriers.”80  
Along with the beef exporters’ ban, there were other trade constraints on U.S. 
exporters that involved health and safety issues. The European Union took a very 
strict position on genetically modified crops and restricted these crops in the 
European market.  As a result, American agricultural exporters could not sell their 
genetically modified crops in the European markets, even though they had done so 
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before.  Agricultural companies such as Monsanto lost significant amounts in sales 
due to the genetic modified crops ban.81  American companies did not only lose 
market shares in Europe, but the ban had a spill over effect to other regions such as 
Africa, that inevitably affected U.S. farmers.  
Box 1. European regulation: The spill-over effect in Africa 
* 82 
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European regulation: The spill-over effect in Africa 
 
The constraints of strict regulation on genetically modified crops had a 
spill over effect to the African market and created problems to American’s global 
market share.  The European Union agreed to improve trade with African 
countries by removing all existing trade barriers between Europe and Africa. 
Using genetically modified crops would limit access to the European market by 
African farmers. Therefore, American providers of genetically modified crops had 
difficulties selling their bio-technology to African farmers. 
  
Some African countries refused to accept food aid sent to regions plagued 
with famine because the food could be “contaminated” with genetically modified 
crops. Hence, to provide food aid to Africa, the U.S. could only buy from non-
genetically modified farmers, or from abroad. The ban of genetically modified 
crops created disputes between the European Union and the United States. The 
U.S. accused Europe of impeding economic and humanitarian development in 
Africa.* For American companies that specialized in agriculture with genetically 
modified crops, the European single market became almost inaccessible. 
Agricultural exports had to be altered to meet European standards, which 
increased the cost of production. 
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Regulatory differences on consumer and environmental safety also created 
constraints for American companies in Europe.  
“American cosmetics makers changed their formula for aftershave lotion 
because Brussels (Capitol of the European Union) passed a rule banning 
ethanol, an ingredient that was just fine with the U.S. government. 
McDonald’s changed the rubber toys placed in its Happy Meals all over 
the world because Brussels passed a rule banning a softening chemical 
that Mc Donald’s had used for years with no complaints from regulators 
in Washington D.C. The EU makes rules that govern Amazon.com’s 
sales techniques, and the bumpers that General Motors puts on its 
Corvettes, and the kind of wheat that General Mills can put in its 
Wheaties.”83   
 
 
Although these examples had harsh effects American companies, these rules 
are established indiscriminately. The European Commission acts in the best interest 
of the people and enforces laws to support the European Union. European companies 
have to abide by the same regulations and fall under the same scrutiny as American 
companies, therefore, the argument that a Europe was acting as a “fortress’ should not 
apply in these cases. 
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3.5. Summary 
These examples of constraints show that differences in approaches to health 
and safety issues between the European Union and the U.S. There were new and 
specific barriers for American companies in Europe, and the enlargement of the 
European Union became complex, thus making it difficult for American trade.84 
European Union advocates disagreed with the accusation of being a European fortress 
and responded by lobbying for the advantages the European Union would bring to 
non-member states. The question became what kind of bilateral trade agreements 
should be implemented to bridge the gap between the differences in regulatory 
ideology without jeopardizing the protection of consumer and the environment? 
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PART IV 
 
4.1. European Response 
As illustrated in the previous sections, the creation of the European Union has 
increased internal free trade, but has not been able to achieve the same success from 
transatlantic trading partners. Trade disputes and trade flow data show that several 
impediments to trade to American companies still exist. These impediments result 
from non-tariff barriers for market protection and from different cultures, regulations 
and strict institutional controls. The European Union advocates lobby for taking the 
necessary steps to eliminate the existing barriers to trade. They argue that in order to 
free the European market from protectionist activities, transatlantic negotiation should 
focus on trade liberalization and market openness.85  
 The existing trade barriers have brought American and European 
representatives to the negotiation table to formulate trade agreements and facilitate 
commerce. An important issue in international trade is the interdependence between 
both markets. Germany’s economic growth, for example, relies more on exports than 
on home consumption.86 A slowing German economy would create a spillover effect 
and eventually hurt the American economy. Because the European market is 
connected with Germany, which is considered as the engine of European growth, a 
stagnant German economy would slow down overall economic growth in Europe. 
This, in turn would affect American exports to Europe and impede American 
                                                 
85 Mandelson, 2005 
86 Miller, 2007 
    36
growth. 87  Therefore, it would be in both regions’ self-interest to liberalize 
transatlantic trade flow. Good relations could be translated into increased trade flow 
and economic growth. 
European representatives argue that the single market will create lucrative 
opportunities for American companies even with some existing constraints. 88  
American complaints might have influenced the opening of the European market to 
non-member states, but an important reason was that “the internal market does not 
easily tolerate inconsistencies between internal and external measures.”89 To achieve 
internal and external free trade policies, a pro-transatlantic agenda based on free trade 
among both markets, played an important role in creating the European Union. 
 
4.2. Theoretical framework: Free Trade 
Economists and business individuals would agree that a firm’s goal is to 
maximize profit. Generally, economic growth equals the increase of profit. Trade 
theory tells us that trade between markets that embrace free trade would allow 
companies to experience economic growth, thus increasing profit. Trade theory 
continues to elaborate that companies should specialize in production of goods and 
services that they can produce more efficiently.90 A later revision of the theory argues 
that companies should specialize in regions where factor endowments are abundant. 
This school of thought introduced by Heckscher-Ohlin explains that by doing so, 
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companies will create a comparative advantage, which eventually will lead to an 
increase of market share and consequently an increase in profit.91  
Another feature of trade theory is the phenomenon of economy of scale, which 
occurs when a firm can reduce its cost associated with large output.92 In addition, it 
lets companies use labor and equipment more productively to increase growth, which 
leads to more profit.   Economy of scale allows companies to focus on production of a 
specific good or service and export to other regions in which trade agreements permit 
it. Companies would not only increase market share, but in certain instances, establish 
a first mover advantage, a strategic advantage that occur to the early entrants into an 
industry or market.93 Accordingly, this also will create an advantage in increasing 
market share and profit. With regards to this theory, the characteristic of the European 
Union is an example of free trade. Hence U.S. companies that do business in the 
European Union can increase their market share. 
In order to profit from free trade, markets have to liberalize trade and encourage 
the free flow of goods and services. If foreign products are hindered from entering the 
market due to tariffs, companies are prevented from creating a comparative advantage 
effectively.  In the case of transatlantic trade, it is in the best interest of both to agree 
to trade liberalization and let free trade create economic growth for all trade partners. 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commission in charge of External Relations and 
European Neighborhood Policy, strongly pushed for good and healthy relationships 
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between the U.S. and Europe in order to keep a competitive position in the world 
market. She stated that to maintain close ties between the U.S. and Europe, both 
economies had to run on a transparent set of common rules.94 The European Union 
promotes closer ties with the United States by entering into trade agreements and 
loosening trade regulations that have hindered US products to enter the market.    
 
4.3. Transatlantic Trade: Approaches to closer ties 
Transatlantic trade is the most abundant between the European Union and the 
U.S., as these regions have the largest bilateral relationship in the world.95   Economic 
transactions between the two markets happen in three ways: (1) exports of goods and 
services, (2) foreign direct investment, and (3) trade between subsidiaries.  Trade 
movement between both regions equals almost half of all world trades of good and 
services and the greater part of the trade flow is dispute free. About 14 million jobs 
are a direct result of transatlantic trade.96 
Although, historically, the majority of trade was of goods, today foreign direct 
investment plays a significant role in international business. Almost half of American 
foreign direct investment went to Europe and in return, over two thirds of Europe’s 
total world investment landed in the U.S. market.97  “Trade- everything from farm 
products to automobiles to computer software- constitutes a relatively small portion 
of transatlantic economic activity, less than 20 percent. By a wide range, EU and U.S. 
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investment in each other economies is what drives markets jobs, innovation and 
business activities.”98 This results show clearly that both sides of the Atlantic have 
taken advantages of economic cooperation. 
 
Chart 1: Total Trade (Import + Export) comparison. EU-U.S. vs. EU-China  
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Bilateral trade agreements and economic summits are evidence that both sides 
of the Atlantic seeking closer ties between both markets. In 1995, the European 
Union and the United States agreed on a closer transatlantic partnership, titled the 
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New Transatlantic Agenda. It is based on a four pillar action plan; promoting peace 
and stability, democracy and development around the world; responding to global 
changes; contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations; 
and building closer ties across the both regions.99  The commitment to economic 
relations reads as follows:  
“We will strengthen regulatory cooperation, in particular by encouraging 
regulatory agencies to give a high priority to cooperation with their respective 
transatlantic counterparts, so as to address technical and non-tariff barriers to 
trade resulting from divergent regulatory processes. We aim to conclude an 
agreement on mutual recognition of conformity assessment (which includes 
certification and testing procedures) for certain sectors as soon as possible. We 
will continue the ongoing work in several sectors and identify others for further 
work.”100 
 
Over the last decade, American and European trade representatives have set up 
transatlantic institutions to establish a regulatory body that hopes to eliminate the still 
existing barriers to trade. The advantages of transatlantic institutions are that it would 
lobby for the best interest for both markets indiscriminately. The intention to create 
transatlantic institutions was to deepen transatlantic trade by opening the economies. 
The European Air Safety Agency set new objectives to improve air transport within 
the European Union and its neighbor states. In addition, it works on creating a single 
airspace between Europe and the United States, with the hopes to increase economic 
growth. Jacque Barrot, European Commission Vice President, states that “an open 
aviation area would generate some 17 million extra passengers a year and consumer 
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benefits of over 5 billion dollars a year, not to mention new jobs on both sides of the 
Atlantic.”101   An agreement was signed in April 2007 with the intention to create a 
single air transport market between Europe and the United States.102 Within that new 
market American and European airlines have access to each market and will make 
travel and transport between both markets easier. In addition, this agreement will 
bring Europe and the USA closer together and will have a positive economic impact 
on both markets. Jacques Barrot saluted the cooperation between Europe and the 
USA and its effect on Europe. “Already, the European airline industry is feeling its 
effects in a positive way, with plans for new services and signs of a much more 
flexible and dynamic approach to airline investment among European carriers.”103  
Trade between the United States and Europe is characterized mainly by 
harmonization agreements. Especially in the pharmaceutical industry, drug approval 
between Europe and the USA are harmonized.104  Harmonization is defined as a 
process where regulations are changed so that they meet the requirement of an 
international institution which set international standards.105 However, this process of 
trade liberalization through harmonization is difficult to achieve, because it implies 
that a country changes its regulatory system to meet the standards of the trading 
partner. Currently, there are talks to create more Multinational Recognition 
Agreements between the U.S. and Europe. 
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 The concession of Mutual Recognition Agreements, a process that exists 
among the European member states or a combination of both (harmonization and 
mutual recognition) could create an even more effective trade system.106  Mutual 
Recognition Agreements are characterized as a process by which regulatory 
institutions develop confidence that the reports or certificates of foreign institution 
have the same value.107 In short, the regulatory institutions from a particular region 
recognize products and services that have been accepted by a regulatory institution in 
a foreign region. These agreements require a high level of trust in foreign regulatory 
procedures and the benefits are high for companies, because they don’t have to adopt 
their products to different regulations and only have on fulfill one testing 
requirement.   
With both regions understanding the importance of market openness and 
liberalized trade, trade disputes should weaken over the time. To explain the 
characteristics of transatlantic disputes, Mariann F. Boel, European Union Agriculture 
and Rural Development Commissioner, describes it as “two elephants making a lot of 
noise” and “we seem to speak different but similar dialects of a strange technical 
languages.”108 Both regions find it difficult to agree on a trade agreement that would 
benefit both sides equally. However, there have been several steps to reform the 
economic policies.  
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4.3.1. Case Study: Common Agricultural Policy - The Reform 
 
Box 2: Treaty of Rome: Article 39 
 
 
 
History- In the mid 1960s, a significant amount of Europe’s employment was 
in the agriculture sector. It was important to the Union to set up policies to support 
farmers in Europe. The Common Agriculture Policy’s objective, employed in 1962 
was to stabilize European agriculture market by increasing agricultural productivity, 
ensuring supply-chain and competitive prices, and guaranteeing a fair standard of 
living for farmers.109 This policy guaranteed minimum prices on certain crops. In 
addition, it discriminated against foreign goods through tariffs and import prices. 
Even if U.S. products entered the market, there were more hurdles to jump 
over to compete for the European market share. The Common Agricultural Policy had 
a clause that demanded European member states import agricultural products from 
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The Objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy 
Treaty of Rome: Article 39 
 
¾ Increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by 
ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the 
optimum utilization of the factors of production, in particular labor; 
¾ Ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular 
by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture; 
¾ Stabilize markets; 
¾ Assure the availability of supplies; 
¾ Ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. 
 
Sources: European Commission  
http://www.bmdf.co.uk/rometreaty.pdf 
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other member states first, before allowing goods to enter from abroad. 110   This 
practice created trade diversions that would discriminate against foreign suppliers and 
affect competition negatively. To make things worse, the European Union set “entry 
prices” on foreign goods entering the market, which were normally higher than the 
market price; hence U.S. products had difficulties competing in the market. This 
approach was a tool of protectionism to keep competition out of the market.  
While trade diversion and universal prices in Europe allowed European 
farmers to increase market share, they decreased farmers’ competitiveness in the 
world market. The Common Agricultural Policy awarded European farmer with 
subsidies to compensate for the loss in the world market.111 The lack of competitive 
prices and government subsidies not only affected foreign goods in the European 
market, but it also manipulated world prices. The Common Agricultural Policy 
created many disputes between to the U.S. farmer supporters and the European Union, 
because of the inaccessibility to the European market. Mariann Fischer Boel, 
Agriculture and Rural Development Commissioner, defended the creation of the 
Common Agricultural Policy as follows: “In much of Europe, food shortages had 
become serious, and damaged national agricultural systems needed to rebuild 
themselves. The alternative was hunger, social disorder in rural areas and an exodus 
from farmland to cities which were already short of housing and jobs.”112 
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The European Union seemed to understand the implication of the Common 
Agricultural Policy on trade relations and world prices. Therefore, they revised the 
policy to make the European agricultural industry more competitive and to diminish 
trade disputes with the United States.   
Policy reform- Following heated trade disputes with the U.S., the European 
Union decided to cut guaranteed prices on farm goods. In addition, the new reform 
reduced tariffs on foreign goods. European farmers have to follow and maintain strict 
environmental rules to be rewarded financial support from the government. Instead of 
offering free money as subsidies, this money will be used to provide “- pleasant fields, 
clean air and water, a reliable level of food safety” to European citizens.113 As a result, 
farmers focused their production on demand driven goods and competition against 
foreign exporters. With these reforms, Europe is opening up the market to 
competition and keeping its commitment to social protection. “Our priorities should 
therefore to be to invest massively more in the future and at the same time help 
workers to adapt to the more rapid economic changes that the combination of deeper 
market integration and increased supply side investment will bring.”114 
The Common Agricultural Policy presents a good case study of how the 
European Union is modifying regulations to open up the market to foreign products. 
The question on existing disputes such as genetically modified crops has not been 
answered yet. Since this dispute reflects different ideologies of consumer and 
environmental safety, it is doomed to continue to stay on the top of transatlantic 
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negotiation agendas. However, it is predicted to find concessions instead of a trade 
war.115  In an address at the Doha Round, Mariann Fischer presents Europe’s position 
on genetically modified crops: “If the EU agreed to open up its agricultural markets 
that include genetically modified (GM) products. We have no anti-GM agenda. And 
we are not trying to smuggle in protectionism through the back door, under cover of 
concerns about food safety and the environment.” 116  In 2001, the European 
Commission approved genetically modified processed oil for food use. Six years 
later, the European Commission authorized several genetically modified oilseed rapes 
to be sold in the European market if they meet safety and appropriate labeling 
standards.117   
 
4.4. Effects of EU external relations  
Although the enlargement of the European Single Market creates some 
challenges to U.S. economic and political interests, it also has a positive effect as 
well.118  The European Union not only created a larger playground for international 
companies, but also established a more stable and predictable macro-economic 
climate for investments, with uniform rules.119 Most importantly, the enlargement of 
the European Union ended the discrimination of American products in European 
countries that were not part of the European Union. The European Union signed 
bilateral treaties with several central and eastern European countries, which allowed 
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European goods and services to enter the markets without barriers but required 
American companies to pay high tariffs. Due to this, American goods and services 
had to compete against European Union’s duty-free products in eastern and central 
European markets.120  With the enlargements of the European Union, eastern and 
central European markets fall under the same policy of the European Union and 
therefore, American products became more competitive in eastern and central 
European market, because tariffs (if applicable) might be lower in the European 
Union. Trade agreements with the European Union had a tendency to be more 
beneficial than with eastern and central European countries. 
American companies have varies interests in conducting business in Europe. 
There are companies that export to Europe without significant physical presence in 
the market and there are companies that have a presence through subsidiaries or joint 
venture.121  Foreign companies with a significant European market presence increased 
their investments dramatically.122  Even companies that recently entered the markets 
took advantages of European grant programs. The telecommunications industry 
benefited greatly from European grants. IBM, AT&T and DEC participated in grant 
programs from the European Union. To take full advantage of the expanded single 
market, companies should establish themselves in the market.  “When you see the 
profits being made by companies like Ford and General Motors in the European 
operations, you know that they have established themselves in the European 
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operations, and have done that in a very profitable way.”123  A stronger European 
market will benefit American companies.  
If the extension of the European single market created more opportunity for 
U.S. companies, would the fear of a European fortress still occur? History has showed 
that this fear is unjustified. As long as the European single market was an open 
market and sought international trade relationships with the United States, both sides 
would benefit from this relationship. In 1989, Gerrit Jeelof, Vice Chairman of N.V. 
Philips Corporation, presented a lecture at the University of Michigan promoting 
transatlantic trade and addressing the accusation of a “European Fortress”. He argues 
that it would be an outcome of American attitude towards European companies. If the 
U.S. discriminated against the establishment of European companies in the U.S., then 
it would be reasonable that Europeans would create similar discriminatory practices 
against U.S. companies.124  In other words, a European Fortress in form of trade 
barriers would retaliate against US restrictions on European trade. 
 
4.5. Summary 
European approaches to ease transatlantic tensions present a promising future 
for American companies. With the right international strategy to penetrate the 
European Single Market, U.S. companies could increase profit from European trade 
attitude. In other words, when overcoming obstacles that have been created through 
differences in regulations, Europe offers opportunities for abundant profit. 
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PART V 
 
5.1. Opportunities in the European Union  
There are various circumstances that present advantages of the European 
Union to American companies. First, established American companies in the 
European market should enjoy the same perks of regional integration as European 
companies. Some of these perks are free flow of goods, services, labor and 
investment within the market, which reduces transaction and transportation costs. 
Liberalized trade and competition allows companies to compete for market share and 
make them more efficient Second, by adapting to European regulations, new 
opportunities arise. The characteristics of the European market reduce the distance 
between both markets. Taking into consideration the cost of distance versus benefits, 
it can be argued that the opportunities will outweigh constraints on U.S. companies. 
Advantages will arise from taking advantages of opportunities by applying strategies 
of arbitrage. Arbitrage in this context means to benefit of cultural, economical and 
administrative differences.125 It can be concluded, that because the European member 
states accept uniform regulations, and administrative procedures, US firms can 
benefit by using a localization strategy to comply with European regulations. This 
will achieve economies of scale approach (with limited modification to meet 
differences in demand) because the products do not have to comply with other 
                                                 
125 Ghemawat, 2003 pg. 3 
    50
regulations. Regional integrated markets can reduce liability of foreignness to non-
member firms. 
 
5.1.1. Distance opportunities 
As discussed previously, the distance between Europe and the United States 
has changed and it has resulted in creating benefits as well as constraints for 
American companies. Geographic distance could be assessed as a shorter distance. 
For instance, in order for an American product to reach a particular European member 
state market, the product has to travel the physical distance through other countries 
that are located between both states. Prior the creation of the European Union, border 
control and customs slowed down transportation. Since creation of the European 
Union, the American product has a closer port of entry to the market and does not 
lose time at each border.  
The European Union possesses one of the most advanced transportation 
systems in the world, which facilitate intra-European transportation. The 
transportation network is interconnected with European states and its neighbors. In 
addition, European institutions were able to reduce distance between Europe and the 
United States by creating a transatlantic aviation area.  Considering the advancement 
of infrastructure, the new size of the European market, and the elimination of borders 
in Europe, it can be concluded that the European Union reduces distance between 
both markets, hence reduced transportation costs. 
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5.1.2. Economic & Administrative Opportunities  
One of the key complaints from American companies regard stricter European 
regulations and standards. American firms have had to adjust many products to meet 
European standards, which has increased production costs. However, complying with 
the standards can be an advantage as well. Many competitors might not be able to 
meet the strict regulations set by the European Union.  The cost to enter the market, 
would allow only certain products to compete in the market. As a result, only few and 
very competitive products would compete for market share. This would not only 
apply to non-European products but to some European products as well. Prior to the 
implementation of the single market policies, several European countries had more 
relaxed policy on products, which means they had to adopt  to the new standards as 
well. 
By adopting products to higher consumer and environmental protection, 
American firms could create a competitive advantage by offering consumer and 
environmental friendly products. This would not only create entry in the European 
market but might be beneficial in the home and world market as well. Since European 
standards are very strict they might meet standards in other regions as well. 
Consequently, products could be standardized to European standards and sold 
internationally, thus creating an economy of scale. 
European economic reforms create opportunities for arbitrage. The 
elimination of physical barriers allows American companies to find the most efficient 
place and strategy to conduct business, where the liability of foreignness is low. From 
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there, products can be shipped to different market segments of the European Union. 
The United Kingdom might be a good place of entry into the European Union with 
respect to the liability of foreignness because of many similarities, such as English 
being the defacto language of business. 
Then there is arbitrage of factor endowments, labor, and knowledge.  
Companies can set up business where factor endowments are abundant and 
inexpensive to obtain. The new accession of Eastern Europe could present a good 
place for investing in factor endowments. These countries have not been part of the 
European Monetary Union yet, thus still using their national currency. These 
currencies might stand weaker against the dollar than the Euro, which means 
investment could create better value. From a long term perspective, land and currency 
may increase in value (assuming they will convert to Euro in the near future) and the 
return of investment will pay off.  
For multinational companies, it is important to recruit a talented workforce.  
The European Union has a variety of diverse human capital with varied educational 
and professional backgrounds. American companies can pull talented labor from 
across Europe to take advantage of differential knowledge. The elimination of 
physical barriers combined with the free flow of labor makes it possible to relocate 
labor within the European boundaries. The flow of labor and transfer of knowledge 
contributes to creating comparative advantages to multinational companies.  
The strong Euro also presents further opportunities to American products. 
Since the Euro has been very stable and strong against the U.S. dollar, American 
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exports to Europe should increase, because American products are cheaper with 
respect to the value of currency. The strong currency also has an effect on profit. If 
the profit margin in Europe is the same as it is in the United States, American 
companies will experience a higher profit than in the home region. The stable Euro 
encourages foreign direct investment in Europe. But most importantly, conducting 
business in Europe does not imply dealing with 27 different currencies. The single 
transparent currency also allows companies to conduct arbitrage. US firms can shop 
within the entire market to find the best price for a particular product or decide to buy 
from outside the European boundaries. This would encourage prices to become more 
competitive.  
European economic reform required government to liberalize industries and 
surrender partial or full control over state owned enterprises. Over the years, state 
owned enterprises have held monopolistic position in industries such as 
telecommunication, energy, and transportation. Trade liberalization would end this. 
What does trade liberalization in protected industries mean to American companies? 
These former state owned companies have the majority of market share and an 
advantage because of brand awareness. However, due to the long-time monopolistic 
position, competition is non-existent or very limited. As a result, American 
companies that penetrate former protected industries can create an early mover 
advantage; being one of the first competitors in the market. In addition, American 
companies might have more experience doing business in a competitive environment, 
whereas state-owned enterprises find it more difficult to implement strategies that 
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deal with competition. With innovative strategies, American companies can take 
advantage of the economic changes and opportunities in Europe.    
 
5.1.3. Cultural opportunities 
From a cultural perspective, the European Union has become more diverse 
and international, due to the easier movement of people in the Union. The free flow 
of people within the Union allows European citizens to become more aware of the 
differences and united culturally as well. The single currency is an example of a 
common culture. People deal with money on a daily basis. The money represents 
sovereignty and an identity. The single currency connects member states’ culture and 
creates a European culture or identity that did not exist before. In the future, with 
deeper integration, the gap between countries’ identities could shrink and a European 
focused identity or cultures could be the outcome, which is describes by T.R. Reid as 
“generation E”.126  Dealing with fewer cultural differences create opportunities to 
multinational firms. Companies can focus on cultural similarities and modify 
products where preferences or taste of the target groups differ.   
The new European generation has the opportunity to travel and relocate easier 
within the Union. They are more aware of the European cultures and languages. A 
population that takes advantages of economic changes in culture creates new 
opportunity for business. For example, Germans can now commute more freely and 
cheaply to Portugal, thus increasing the demand for transportation. American 
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automobile manufactures have designed cars for the European market that travel long 
distances and through different geographic areas.  
Even with the benefits of tolerance, proliferation and a mixture of European 
cultures, there is no evidence of one widely accepted European culture or identity. 
The European unification has lowered most barriers of regulatory institutions, and yet 
the cognitive and normative institutions, which include culture, have not greatly 
diminished.  However, these differences can be exploit as well. The differences can 
be the source of a firm-specific competitive advantage. As argued in international 
business literature, companies who are good at assessing and responding to demands 
for local responsiveness will flourish where other companies falter.  
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PART VI 
 
The main lesson of the study is that there are two broad sources of 
opportunities to U.S. firms in the European Union. While external regulatory barriers 
still exist, European institutions have attempted to lower these barriers to encourage 
transatlantic trade. Once these barriers are breached by U.S. firms, they will flourish 
from the opportunities the expanded market brings. The second source of 
opportunities derives from country-specific barriers, including cultural differences. 
The European Union may reduce cultural barriers some day. Since these cultural 
differences still exist, U.S. firms that excel at local responsiveness will enjoy a 
competitive advantage.127 
 
6.1. Limitations 
There are several limitations that make it difficult to fully understand the 
effects of the European Union on US business. First, the European Commission is 
integrating and updating policies which influence international trade. This makes it 
difficult to forecast trade opportunities in the near future, although bilateral trade 
agreements and policy reform show a tendency of increasing opportunities for 
American companies. Second, the European Union is still in its beginning stages. 
With only 15 years of existence, it is it difficult to predict long-term effects based on 
past experiences. Third, Europe is expanding, adding more members to the Union. By 
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doing so, more countries fall under European economic procedures and this may 
impact US business with these new member states. For example, Turkey has several 
bilateral trade agreements with the United States. US companies export to Turkey. If 
Turkey is granted membership to the European Union, the bilateral trade agreements 
between the United States and Turkey might change, which could create advantages 
or constraints for U.S. firms. Finally, the advancement of technology, such as cheaper 
and better telecommunication, transport and information technology will create new 
business opportunities in these areas.  
 
6.2. Future Work 
The European Union is the most integrated market from all regional trading 
regions in the world. However, it is still evolving. The deepening and widening of the 
market affect trade relations as well. From firm level perspectives, future studies 
might examine what attributes American companies need to possess to take full 
advantages for the market. Continued studies in academia could analyze if the 
economic characteristics of the European Union can be applied to other economic 
regions with similar of different characteristics. 
 
6.3. Conclusion  
The creation of the European Union was inevitable amid world economic 
changes in the 1980s and 1990s. European institutions have to implement a market 
system that encourages intra-regional trade but also shows integrity to European 
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consumers and environmental protection values. Strict regulations force many 
multinational companies to change production procedures and strategies, which 
increase total production costs. The protection of major industries creates further 
barriers for some American goods and services. However, the European Union 
understands the importance of good transatlantic relations and is working on 
eliminating barriers. Europe’s attitude is reflected in bilateral trade agreements and 
economic reforms that open up the market for American products. 
Even with existing non-tariff barriers, the characteristic of the single market 
allow U.S. companies to benefit. Because the European Union is one gigantic market 
that encompasses 27 individual markets, U.S. firms face a reduced liability of 
foreignness. The distance between culture, business procedures still exist, but the 
creation of European Union gives some commonalities and leverage, which reduces 
distance.  
When an American company meets the necessary requirements to enter one 
the European member states, the liability of foreignness is reduced due the 
elimination of intraregional barriers and the reduction of distance. Once established in 
one European market, achieving economies of scales, improvement of knowledge 
transfer and the expansion to other European market should be easier than prior to the 
creation of the European Union. As a result, it can be concluded that the European 
Union presents lucrative opportunities to American companies. 
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